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We Are Going
by
Jennifer L. Levi *

I. Introduction
The legal landscape for same-sex couples seeking to marry
has shifted dramatically over the last five years. On October 10,
2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court became the third state
high court to rule that its state constitution could not sustain a
statutory framework that excludes same-sex couples from mar

rying,1 following the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on
November 18, 2003,2 and the California Supreme Court on May
*

Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Many

thanks to Eileen Rodriguez, Sarah Morton, Amanda Hainsworth, Liz MonninBrowder, Caitlin Reed, Karen Loewy, and Michele Granda for assistance with
the preparation of and editing and research for this article. For purposes of
disclosure, the author was one of the attorneys of record in both the Goodridge
and Kerrigan marriage equality cases discussed herein.
Perhaps the greatest challenge of writing about the marriage equality
movement is keeping up with the pace of legal developments. Since the time
this article was submittied for publication, two major changes have occurred,
again significantly reforming the legal landscape. On April 3, 2009, the Iowa
Supreme Court held that excluding same-sex couples from marrying violated
that state's constitutional equality guarantees. Varnum v. Brien, __ N.W.2d
__, 2009 WL 874044 (Iowa 2009). As a result of that opinion, same-sex
couples may marry in Iowa beginning on April 27, 2009. In addition, during the
2009 legislative session in Vermont, state legislators passed a marriage equality
law. S. 115, "An Act Relating to Civil Marriage," 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt.
2009) (enacted). Although vetoed by the governor, the legislators overrode the
veto by the required supermajority ensuring that, as of September 1, 2009,
same-sex couples may marry in Vermont. Similar legislation is pending in nu
merous states throughout the country including in Connecticut (to codify that
state high court opinion) (S.B. 899, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009)), New
Hampshire (H.B. 439, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2009)), and Maine. (L.D.
1020, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009)).
1 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
2 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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15, 2008. 3 Same-sex couples throughout the country have gotten
married in Connecticut, Massachusetts, California, and in other
countries throughout the world that provide full marriage equal
ity, including in Canada.
This positive momentum for marriage equality has not pro
ceeded uninterrupted, however. In between the implementation
of the Massachusetts decision and the California decision, five
state high courts rejected constitutional challenges to their states'
exclusionary marriage statutes.4 In addition, with the national
election on November 4, 2008, in which California, Florida, and
Arizona banned marriage for same-sex couples, more than forty
states have now amended their constitutions or enacted legisla
tion to prohibit same-sex couples from marrying. 5 The passage
of Proposition 8 in California, which amended California's con
stitution to define marriage as only being between a man and a
woman, overruled in practice that state's positive Supreme Court
decision, and halted the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex
couples.

6

The validity of Proposition 8 has been contested, so the sta
tus of marriage equality in California remains uncertain as this
article goes to publication. 7 In addition, the Iowa Supreme
Court has not yet issued its decision about whether to uphold a
lower court's determination that8 the state's discriminatory mar
riage statute is unconstitutional.
At this point in time, same-sex couples throughout the coun
try have married while political efforts continue to reverse the
progress toward full equality that began in Massachusetts, ex
isted for a time in California, and has continued in Connecticut.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d
196 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Li. &
Kennedy v. Oregon, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d
963 (Wash. 2005).
5 Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at Al.
6 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (amended by initiative measure Proposition 8,
Nov. 4, 2008).
7 The date for oral argument of the case challenging the constitutionality
of Proposition 8 was Mar. 5, 2009. The California Supreme Court will rule on
the case within 90 days of the date or oral argument.
8 Vamrnum v. Brien, No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Polk County, 2007).
3

4
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Given the success of efforts to adopt exclusionary state constitu
tional amendments and thus cut off the number of states where
marriage equality could be pursued, 9 marriage equality oppo
nents are largely focused on defending Proposition 8 and in fur
ther isolating the two New England states that allow same-sex
couples to marry as iconoclastic exceptions to otherwise exclu
sively heterosexual marriage regimes.
This article looks at developments in the marriage equality
movement from the time that the Massachusetts case was finally
decided by its high court, and assesses the viability of efforts to
turn back the clock on equal marriage rights. Because much has
been written about the Massachusetts case and its place in history, 10 this analysis starts with the decision by Connecticut's Su
preme Court, the consolidated cases that became the California
decision and contemporary challenges to the constitutional
amendment that has since undermined its strength, as well as the
cases in which state high courts rejected challenges to discrimina
tory marriage laws.
Backtracking in time, the article then addresses the legal de
velopments that took place between the time the Massachusetts
and California decisions were issued, focusing in particular on
the fact that, for a short time, same-sex couples could marry in
Massachusetts regardless of residency despite the existence of a
reverse evasion law." The reverse evasion law, well-established
in Massachusetts, until recently prohibited the issuance of mar
riage licenses in Massachusetts to non-residents who traveled to
Massachusetts specifically for the purpose of evading their own
states' marriage prohibitions. While Massachusetts has since re
pealed that reverse evasion law, 12 there remain serious questions
about the legal significance of marriages entered into by out-of
state couples in the interim period and uncertainty whether, for
many of those out-of-state couples, those licenses issued lawfully.
9 Thirty states currently have exclusionary constitutional amendments.
See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, www.hrc.org/
documents/marriage-prohibitions.pdf (Nov. 17, 2008).
10 Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(2005).
11 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207 §§ 11, 12, 13, 50 (1913).
12 An Act Relative to Certain Marriage Laws, ch. 216, 2008 Mass. Acts
(repealing sections 11, 12, 13, & 50 of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207).
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This article evaluates the validity of those marriages. The article
concludes by predicting that efforts to reverse the course of his
tory and shut down the ability of same-sex couples from across
the country to marry will fail.

II. Connecticut's Road to Equality
A few months after the Goodridge v. Departmentof Public
Health decision made it possible for same-sex couples to marry in
Massachusetts, 13 eight same-sex couples filed suit to challenge
Connecticut's denial of their right to marry. 14 The primary argu
ments in the Connecticut case, much like the other state cases,
were equality and due process of law under the state
constitution.
While this litigation was underway, Connecticut passed a law
in 2005 that created civil unions as an alternative to marriage for
same-sex couples while simultaneously defining marriage as ex
clusively between one man and one woman. 15 Similar legislation
had already passed in Vermont, California, and New Jersey, and
16
has since been adopted in New Hampshire.
Connecticut's civil union law provided many of the same
substantive protections for same-sex couples as California's do
mestic partnership laws. Therefore, the Connecticut case was the
second one to reach a high court in a jurisdiction which had in
place a near marriage equivalent. It was because of this compre
hensive protection under law that the Connecticut Superior
Court rejected the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and
granted that of the state defendants. The outcome of the lower
court's resolution of the case could have been predicted from the
opening line of the opinion (stating the existence of the civil
union law) and the framing of the case. 17 As framed by Judge
Patty Pittman, the issue before the court was whether it should
declare the distinction between civil unions and marriage, a dis
Goodridge,798 N.E.2d 941.
Jane Gordon, Gay Marriage Case Now Before the Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 2, 2006, at 3.
15 An Act Concerning Civil Unions, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38aa 
46b-38pp (2005).
16 N.H REV. STAT. § 457-A:1 (2008).
17 Kerrigan v. State, 909 A.2d 89 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006).
13

14
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tinction the court viewed as being one of name only, to be one of
constitutional magnitude.
In fairly pointed language, the Connecticut Superior Court
analogized the case to one that might be brought by a woman
offended by the incorporation of male gendered pronouns in the
criminal law or by the statement in the state constitution that "all
men . . . are equal in rights." According to Judge Pittman,
"While one may yet feel a pang at the historical injustice
presented by this phrase, it is of no legal significance." 18 Moreo
ver, explained Judge Pittman, "offensiveness is largely in the eye
of the beholder."' 19 As a result, she concluded that "the naming
of legal matters [is] an area particularly suited to legislative
'20
rather than judicial policy-making.
The plaintiff couples appealed the case, which was taken on
direct appellate review by the state high court. Similar to the
context in California, Connecticut's comprehensive marriage
equivalent forced the high court to analyze the statutory exclu
sion of same-sex couples from marriage in a jurisdiction where
the legislature had already spoken to the importance of ex
tending comprehensive family protections to families formed by
same-sex couples. Contrary to the lower court's reasoning, the
Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged that the distinction
between civil unions and marriage is not "constitutionally insig
nificant" 21 and that "because the institution of marriage carries
with it a status and significance that the newly created classifica
tion of civil unions does not embody, the segregation of hetero
sexual and homosexual couples into separate institutions
constitutes a cognizable harm."' 22 Connecticut's high court found
that, although the civil union law purported to offer same-sex
couples "all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities
under law" as marriage, 23 this statutory framework denied samesex couples at least one fundamentally important right, "the free
'24
dom to marry."

19

Id. at 98 (emphasis in original).
Id.

20

Id.

21

Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 415.

22

Id. at 412.

23

CONN. GEN. STAT.

24

Kerrigan,957 A.2d at 416.

18

§§ 46b-38nn; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 413.
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In analyzing the plaintiff couples' equal protection chal
lenge, Connecticut's high court deemed sexual orientation to be
a "quasi-suspect" classification, like gender, and therefore ap
plied heightened or intermediate scrutiny to assess the constitu
tionality of the state's discriminatory marriage law. 25 The court's
conclusion that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification
deserving of heightened scrutiny was based on the historic and
enduring "purposeful and invidious discrimination" against gays
and lesbians and the fact that this minority group's defining char
acteristic (their sexual orientation) is of no meaningful conse
quence to their participation in society.2 6 Moreover, the court
determined that sexual orientation is "such an essential compo
nent of personhood" that it would be "wholly unacceptable" for
the state to require modification. 27 As a result, the court applied
intermediate scrutiny and held that the marriage statute violated
the state's constitutional guarantee of equal protection because
the state failed to demonstrate that denying the right to marry on
the basis of sexual orientation was "substantially related to an
2' 8
important government interest.
Because the state failed to meet its burden under the inter
mediate scrutiny standard, the court declined to reach the issue
of whether sexual orientation is a suspect classification deserving
strict scrutiny. 29 Thus, Connecticut's high court diverged from
both the high court in California that applied strict scrutiny, and
high courts in Massachusetts and other states that applied some
version of rational basis review to decide whether excluding
same-sex couples from marriage violates state constitutional
30
law.
On November 4, 2008, Connecticut voters rejected a refer
endum to hold a constitutional convention in which a state con
stitutional provision to undermine the Kerrigan v. Commissioner

25

Id.

26
28

Id. at 432.
Id.
Id. at 423 (citing Ramos v. Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003).

29

Id.

30

Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 961.

27
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of Public Health ruling could have been introduced. 31 No viable
political threat to marriage equality remains in Connecticut.

I. California Takes a Step Forward, Then a
Step Back
California was the second state to permit same-sex couples
to marry. As the most populous state, one in which one out of
nine Americans lives (just over 10 percent), its legal landscape
has often served as a bellwether for the rest of the country. The
passage of the Proposition 8 ballot initiative that defined mar
riage as only heterosexual marriage undermined the constitu
tional foundation of the decision coming out of the consolidated
marriage cases. The outcome in the case challenging Proposition
8 has become, therefore, even that much more significant to the
marriage equality movement. This section analyzes the history
leading up to the marriage case, the case itself, the Proposition 8
ballot initiative, and the litigation challenging the validity of the
process used to change California's constitution.
A. Pre-CaseMarriageActivity
In re Marriage Cases have a somewhat long, and definitely
complicated, procedural history. 32 This history is worth describ
ing in some detail to convey the depth and breadth of the politi
cal landscape on both sides of the "v" in the consolidated
marriage cases. The consolidated cases date indirectly back to
February, 2004, when the City of San Francisco, at the initiative
of Mayor Gavin Newsom, began issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples. 33 The relevant time period was the 180 day
gap between when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu
setts34 issued its opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, holding that same-sex couples could not constitutionally

31
Equality's Winding Path, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A32; Kerrigan,
957 A.2d at 413.
32 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384.
33 Carolyn Marshall, Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San FranciscoCer
emonies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A24.
34 The issued date was Nov. 20, 2003. The opinion stated, "Entry of judg
ment shall be stayed for 180 days to permit the Legislature to take such action
as it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion." Goodridge 798 N.E.2d at
970.
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be excluded from the Commonwealth's marriage statutes, and
the effective date of that opinion. During that gap period, a num
ber of localities, including some in New York 35 and San Francisco
in California began issuing marriage licenses in anticipation that
the state courts in those jurisdictions would agree with the Goodridge Court.
Opponents of marriage equality in California and elsewhere
sought to quickly shut down the availability of marriage licenses
to same-sex couples. In California, the effort to shut down the
issuance of such licenses was initiated by the Attorney General
through a writ petition to the California Supreme Court and by a
case brought by the Proposition 22 Legal Defense Fund. 36 The
latter case relied on Family Section 308.5 (the initiative statute
known as Proposition 22 adopted by California voters in March
2000),37 while the former principally argued that the local offi
cials lacked authority to issue licenses in the absence of a deter
minative court decision. 38 In response to the Attorney General's
writ petition, the California Supreme Court issued a temporary
injunction followed by a final decision, both of which ordered the
City of San Francisco not to issue licenses and invalidated any
licenses already issued. 39 In that final decision, Lockyer v. San
Francisco,the California high court expressly reserved judgment
on the substantive issue raised by the Proposition 22 Legal De
fense Fund - that is, whether the state constitution could sustain
35 Thomas Crampton, Same-Sex Marriage:New Paltz; Despite Charges,
Mayor Pledges to Keep Marrying Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004 (New
York/Region); Thomas Crampton & Christine Hauser, Gay MarriageDebate
Shifts to Small New York Village, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004 (New York/Re
gion); Lisa W. Foderaro, Mayors Asked to Face the Music, as in a Same-Sex
Wedding March, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004 (New York/Region).
36
Lockyer v. San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 465-66 (Cal. 2004).
37
CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2004) states that "[o]nly marriage between a
man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." Plaintiffs in the Mar
riage Cases maintained that this initiative amendment only applied to marriages
entered into outside of California and was not relevant to the determination of
whether same-sex couples could marry in California. The Proposition 22 Legal
Defense Fund disagreed arguing that it applied as a limiting principle both to
marriages entered into in and outside of California. In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d at 409-410.
38 Id. at 466-67.
39

Id. at 467.
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an exclusionary statutory framework for marriage. 40 That issue
was squarely presented in cases filed (and eventually consoli
dated) both by the City of San Francisco and 20 same-sex couples
in five different suits challenging their exclusion from the law.
Those cases became the consolidated cases resolved by In re
41
Marriage Cases.

The other significant development that took place in be
tween the issuance of the Goodridge opinion and the ultimate
resolution of the consolidated cases was California's adoption of
a comprehensive domestic partnership law. 42 Unlike in Massa
chusetts where there had been scant or no protections for samesex couples wishing to create families, 43 California had incre
mentally added benefits and protections within a structure it
called domestic partnership to the point where when the mar
riage cases were finally resolved, the status was a near-equivalent
to marriage. 44 It was a near-equivalent because there were dif
ferences between the benefits and protections associated with
marriage and those associated with domestic partnerships but, as
the California Supreme Court characterized them, they were
40 Id. at 397 ("Our decision in Lockyer emphasized ... that the substan
tive question of the constitutional validity of the California marriage statutes
was not before this court in that proceeding, and that our decision was not in
tended to reflect any view on that issue.").
41

Id.

California's domestic partnership law developed incrementally through
at least 16 separate bills starting in 1999, each slowly adding benefits, protec
tions, and responsibilities. See National Center for Lesbian Rights, The Evolu
tion of California Domestic Partnership Law, Sept. 5, 2007, http://www.ncl
rights.org/site/DocServer/timeline-ab205_042307.pdf?doclD=1265.
43 In fact, unlike in California where there were affirmative developments
in the form of growing domestic partnership benefits, the effort to add substan
tive domestic partnership benefits in the form of partner health insurance was
shut down by the Supreme Judicial Court in a challenge initiated by a ten tax
payer suit challenging the authority of municipalities to do so. Connors v. City
of Boston, 714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999).
44 It bears mention to fully appreciate the political climate in California
that predated the issuance of the In re Marriage Cases decision that the Califor
nia legislature twice passed bills authorizing marriage for same-sex couples.
Both times the legislation was vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.
Jordan Rau & Nancy Vogel, Governor Vetoes Same-Sex MarriageBill, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005 at B3, availableat http://articles.latimes.com/2005/sep/30/
local/me-gays30; Jill Tucker, Governor Cites Prop. 22 as He Vetoes Leno Bill,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 2007, at B2.
42
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"relatively minor.

' 45

Again by the California court's characteri
zation, the domestic partnership status could better be under
stood as one comparable to the near marriage-equivalent status
of civil unions embraced by the states of Vermont, New Hamp
shire, New Jersey and Connecticut. 46 Of course, both domestic
partnership status and civil union status are uniquely different
than marriage in the characterization of the relationship. Just as
in Connecticut, it was the magnitude and significance of this dis
tinction that the California court had to evaluate.
B. In re MarriageCases
The answer to the question of the extent to which domestic
partnership and marriage are equivalent legal statuses is, in many
ways, at the heart of the In re MarriageCases opinion. The rea
son for that may be obvious, but given its significance is worth
articulating. In California by the time the consolidated cases
reached the high court, the legislature had spoken to the issue of
the significance of families formed by same-sex couples. By cre
ating the near equivalent status of domestic partnership, the leg
islative intent to treat comparably same-sex couples and
different-sex ones was clear. As the high court agreed, the do
mestic partnership and marital statuses were at their essence
equal in terms of benefits, obligations, and protections. The only
difference was in the name. That difference was key to the high
court's fundamental constitutional rights analysis and is worth
examining in some detail.
The starting point of the court's analysis was the couples'
claim that their exclusion from marriage violated core liberty and
autonomy rights guaranteed by the California constitution. As
the court explained, California precedent well-established as a
constitutional value the "right of two adults who share a loving
45 There are nine enumerated in In re MarriageCases,concerning mainly
differences between domestic partnerships and marriages in eligibility require
ments, the procedures for establishing or dissolving each, and a few provisions
such as "confidential marriages" and a rarely-used veteran's housing tax deduc
tion that seem to have slipped through the cracks when creating legislation, or
that would not apply to same-sex couples because they are provisions affected
by federal law. 183 P.3d at 416 n.24.
46 Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38pp (2005); New Hampshire:
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1-A:8 (2008); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1-28 (2007); Vermont: 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201 (1999).
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relationship to join together to establish an officially recognized
family of their own," 47 a right generally understood as the right

to marry. In response to this claim, the Attorney General of Cal
ifornia agreed with the existence of such a right but maintained
that the right protected was one that is defined by substance and
not by form. In other words, argued the Attorney General, be
cause same-sex couples were afforded all of the substantive pro
tections of marriage through the domestic partnership law and
denied only the status, designation, or48name of marriage, no con
stitutional violation could be shown.
The California court disagreed. As it explained, the consoli
dated cases did not present the interesting (but irrelevant) ques
tion about whether the legislature could deny the denomination
of marriage to all couples ("perhaps in order to emphasize and
clarify that this civil institution is distinct from the religious insti
tution of marriage"). 49 But, because the burden of being denied
the demarcation of marriage fell exclusively to families formed
by same-sex couples, the distinction could not survive constitu
tional scrutiny. At the core of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to marry was the right to have the established "family rela
tionship [be] accorded dignity and respect equal to that accorded
other officially recognized families."' 50 Reserving the designation
of the name "marriage" exclusively for different-sex couples
posed a "serious risk of denying the family relationship of samesex couples such equal dignity and respect."' 51 As the California
court recognized, none of the other marriage cases challenging
state exclusionary marriage laws had presented the question that
was before this high court because in none of the other marriage
cases had an exclusionary marriage law been challenged in a ju
risdiction that had created a near-marriage equivalent.52 As a
In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 399.
Brief of Cal. Att'y Gen., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008)
(No. S147999).
49 In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 399-400.
47
48

50
51

Id. at 400.
Id.

52 As the court acknowledged, the same question had, however, been ad
dressed in a case that was brought in Massachusetts after the Goodridge case
was decided. In Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004), the Mas
sachusetts Senate propounded a question to the high court regarding whether in
response to the Goodridge opinion, the legislature could adopt a comprehen
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result, this was the first high court to grapple with the question of
what the word "marriage" means separate and apart from the
substantive protections and obligations it imparts in the context
of a case brought in a state where a legislature had already man
dated marriage near-equivalence. 53 In striking down the exclu

sionary laws, the court acknowledged the significance of
marriage for same-sex couples while at the same time appreciat
ing the inequality that resulted from the differential licensing
schemes.

As a result, the fundamental rights analysis was tightly inter
woven with the equal protection claim. In pursuit of their equal
protection claim, the plaintiffs argued that the exclusionary mar
riage statutes created classifications based on sex and sexual ori

entation. The high court disagreed that the statutes created a
sex-based classification but agreed that the exclusionary scheme
created a sexual orientation classification. In response to the de
fendants' argument that the exclusion did not create a sexual ori
entation classification because gay people were free to marry,

just not to marry someone of the same sex, the court found it

"sophistic" because the argument would "require the negation of
'54
the person's sexual orientation.
Having found a classification, the court moved on to the ap
plicable level of scrutiny. For the first time in California, and in a
part of the opinion that will have far-reaching effects beyond the

marriage issue, the court held that the applicable standard of re
view for a sexual orientation statutory classification is "strict

sive law based on the Vermont civil union model that would give same-sex
couples all of the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of marriage but deny
the status. In a 4-3 opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court said the legislature
could not constitutionally do so. As that court said, "[T]he traditional, historic
nature and meaning of civil marriage in Massachusetts is as a wholly secular and
dynamic legal institution, the governmental aim of which is to encourage stable
adult relationships for the good of the individual and of the community, espe
cially its children. The very nature and purpose of civil marriage, the court con
cluded, renders unconstitutional any attempt to ban all same-sex couples, as
same-sex couples, from entering into civil marriage." Id. at 569.
53 The Connecticut high court also grappled with the meaning of the word
marriage in Kerrigan.957 A.2d at 417-19.
54 In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 441.
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scrutiny. ' '55 While the court of appeals had found that the sexual
orientation classification could not be considered "suspect," the
high court disagreed. Both courts easily found that the classifica
tion met the requirements that, first, the characteristic bears no
relation to a person's ability to perform or contribute to society;
and, second, the characteristic is associated with a stigma of in
feriority and second class citizenship manifested by the group's
history of legal and social disabilities. 56
The point on which the California Supreme Court departed,
however, from the court of appeals' analysis was on the signifi
cance of the third requirement for suspect classifications, the im
mutability factor. As the California Supreme Court said,
"immutability is not invariably required in order for a character
istic to be considered a suspect classification for equal protection
purposes. '57 By analogy, the court explained that religion is a
suspect classification despite the fact that religion is a "matter
over which an individual has control. '5 8 Citing international
law, 59 the California court found that sexual orientation, whether
or not immutable, is such a "deeply personal characteristic that
[it] is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable
personal costs."' 60 Rejecting the Attorney General's argument
that a fourth requirement should be demonstrated, that of "polit
ical powerlessness," the high court concluded that sexual orienta
tion is a suspect classification subject to strict scrutiny.
Having identified strict scrutiny as the applicable standard of
review, the court acknowledged the state bears a heavy burden
to justify the existing legal structure. Not only would the state
have to advance a constitutionally compelling interest in "reserv
ing the designation of marriage" 61 only for different-sex couples
55 Id. at 441. In a separate section, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim
that the statute created a classification based on sex. To the contrary, the court
found that the statute treated men and women the same with respected to the
marriage conclusion. However, because it did create a classification that al
lowed different-sex but not same-sex couples to marry, the court proceeded
with its sexual orientation classification analysis. Id. at 439-440.
56
57
58

59
60
61

Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.
Egan v. Canada, 2 S.C.R. 513 (1995).
183 P.3d at 442.
Id. at 446.
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and excluding same-sex couples from that designation, but it
would also have to demonstrate that the statutory framework
was necessary to serve the compelling interest. Because the state
could neither articulate a compelling state interest served by the
differential treatment of gay, lesbian, or bisexual partners nor
show that the differential treatment was necessary to serve the
compelling state interest, the exclusionary system failed. In ap
plying the standard of review, the court rejected the arguments
that the constitutionally compelling interest behind the statutory
scheme could be either preserving traditional marriage or en
couraging responsible procreation. 62 The court also rejected jus
tifications for the exclusion offered by the non-state defendants
that the state constitution had mandated it somehow by referring
in earlier versions to gendered terms, like "wife" and "husband,"
in including constitutional protection for separate property
rights. 63
Turning to remedy, the court applied traditional remedy ju
risprudence in its evaluation of whether the exclusionary scheme
should be remedied by extending the exclusion to all or curing
the exclusion by including the excluded class. 64 In a brief part of
the opinion, the court determined that extending marriage equal
ity to the excluded group would more closely approximate the
likely intent of the legislature had it recognized the unconstitu
tionality of the exclusion. 65 As a technical matter, the court
struck the provision of the family law statutes that designated
marriage as the union between a man and a woman and found
that the initiative statute that the court had found to apply to in
state and out-of-state marriages had no constitutional effect. 66
Risking no confusion about the effect of the order, the court
found plaintiffs entitled to the issuance of the writ requested in
cluding directing relevant government officials administering the
marriage laws to act consistently with the decision of the court.
Immediately following the issuance of the In re Marriage Cases
opinion, opponents of marriage equality filed an action seeking
rehearing focusing in particular on the issue of remedy, arguing
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 432.
at 447.
at 452-453.
at 470-471.

Vol. 22, 2009

MarriageEquality for Same-Sex Couples

that the opinion was unclear on that point. That action also
called for a general stay of the effect of the opinion for a five
month period after which the parties argued that the citizens of
the state would have the opportunity to vote by initiative on a
constitutional amendment that would, if passed, reverse the
court. A motion filed by eleven state attorneys general asked for
the same relief to stave off litigation that could result in their
states as a result of the California marriage decision. The court
rejected the efforts at delay of implementation. The state di
rected local officials to begin issuing marriage licenses and such
licenses began to issue on June 16.67 Between June 16, 2008, and
when the change to the California constitution that defined mar
riage as between a man and a woman became effective on No
vember 5, 2008, approximately 18,000 same-sex couples were
married in California. 68
C. Proposition8 Writes Discriminationinto California's
Constitution

On November 4, 2008, the day United States voters elected
Barack Obama as president, Californians passed Proposition 8.69
Passage of the Proposition 8 ballot initiative changed California's
constitution by defining marriage as exclusively being between a
man and a woman, effectively reversing the state high court's de
cision in In re MarriageCases and reinstating California's prohi
bition of same-sex marriage. 70 Constitutional initiatives require
only a majority of voters' support to pass in California, 71 and
Proposition 8 received over fifty-one percent of the vote. 72 The

In re Marriage Cases, 2008 WL 5507760 (June 19, 2008).
Garance Burke, Clerks Confused Over When Gay MarriageBan Be
gins, A.P., Nov. 13, 2008.
69 Jesse McKinley, With Same-Sex Marriage, a Court Takes on the Peo
ple's Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at A18.
70 CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 7.5. Proposition 8 added a new section (7.5) to
Article I of California's constitution. Id. The text of the new section asserts that:
"[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in Califor
nia." Id.
71 CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 4.
72 McKinley, supra note 69, at A18.
67
68

70
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constitutional change took effect immediately (on November 5,
2008).73

D. Current Litigation Challengingthe Validity of Proposition8

On November 19, 2008, the California Supreme Court
granted review of three cases challenging the validity of Proposi

tion 8 and denied 'two petitioners' requests for a stay of the con
stitutional change: 74 The crux of the issue presented relates to

the nature of the change Proposition 8 effected to the California
constitution and the process by which it was carried out.
Proposition 8 was initiated by the electorate, not the legisla
ture, and this raised significant procedural concerns prior and
subsequent to its passage. 75 Article 18 of California's constitution
distinguishes between the processes for amending and revising its
text. 7 6 Whereas the electorate can propose an amendment to the

constitution by initiative which then goes on the ballot, a pro
posed revision to the constitution must originate in the legisla
ture and receive approval from two-thirds of both houses before
77
either going to a popular vote or a constitutional convention.

Case law defines a constitutional revision, as distinct from a con
stitutional amendment, as an effort to change fundamental "un
derlying principles"7 8 of the state's constitution, or as an effort

that constitutes "far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
government plan."' 79 Therefore, deciding whether changing Cali
fornia's definition of marriage to categorically exclude same-sex
73
CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 4 ("A proposed amendment or revision shall be
submitted to the electors and if approved by a majority of votes thereon takes
effect the day after the election unless the measureprovides otherwise.").
74 Strauss v. Horton, No. S168047 (Cal. order to show cause filed Nov. 19,
2008); Tyler v. State of California, No. S168066 (Cal. order to show cause filed
Nov. 19, 2008); City and County of San Francisco v. Horton, No. S168078 (Cal.
order to show cause filed Nov. 19, 2008).
75 Bennett v. Bowen, No. S164520 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 2008); Strauss v. Hor
ton, No. S168047 (Cal. Sup. Ct., 2008); Tyler v. State of California, No. S168066
(Cal. Sup. Ct., 2008); City and County of San Francisco v. Horton, No. S168078
(Cal. Sup. Ct., 2008); Maura Dolan, CaliforniaSupreme Court Keeps Anti-Gay
Marriage Initiative on Ballot, L.A. TiMES, July 17, 2008.
76 See CAL. CONST. art. 18.
77 See id. at §§ 1-3.
78 Livermore v. Waite, 36 P. 424, 102 Cal. 113, 117-19, 123-24 (1894).
79 Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equaliza
tion, 583 P.2d 1281, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 223 (Cal. 1978).
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couples is properly categorized as a constitutional amendment or
a constitutional revision is central to determining the validity of
Proposition 8.
In its order to show cause why relief sought by petitioners
should not be granted, the court directed the State of California
and its agents to brief the following questions:
(1) Is Proposition 8 invalid because it constitutes a revision of, rather
than an amendment to, the California Constitution?
(2) Does Proposition 8 violate the separation of powers doctrine
under the California Constitution?
(3) If Proposition 8 is not unconstitutional, what is its effect, if any, on
the marriages of same-sex couples performed before the adoption of
Proposition 8?80

In the respondent's brief, the Attorney General answered no to
questions one and two and opined that, even if upheld as consti
81
tutional, Proposition 8 should have a prospective effect only. If
the Attorney General is right in its effects argument, same-sex
couples who married in the interim between when In re Marriage
Cases took effect and the day after passage of Proposition 8 can
be confident that their marriages are valid.
The final portion of the State's brief, including the Attorney
General's ultimate conclusion, is perhaps the most significant.
The Attorney General's response exceeded the scope of the
court's questions and put the state firmly on record for support
ing judicial invalidation of Proposition 8.82 After answering the
court's enumerated questions, the Attorney General argued that
even if Proposition 8 was procedurally appropriate as a properly
initiated amendment, Proposition 8 should be "invalidated as vi
olating the inalienable right of liberty found in article 1, section 1
of [California's] Constitution. ' 83 The Attorney General ex
plained that marriage is a fundamental liberty and that as an ina
lienable right protected under Article 1 of California's
constitution, it should not be abrogated in the absence of a com
pelling government interest. 84 Thus, the Attorney General "har
monize[d]" same-sex couples' constitutional right to marry with
Id.
81 See Brief for Respondent at 61, 91, City and County of San Francisco v.
Horton, No. S168078 (Cal. Feb. 3, 2009).
82 See id. at 91.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 76-77, 90,
80

72
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the people's power to amend the constitution by initiative by
85
subjecting Proposition 8 to strict scrutiny, which it must fail.
The court already held in In re Marriage Cases that there was no
compelling reason to deny people's right to marry based on the
suspect classification of sexual orientation, and the language of
Proposition 8 is the same as the former language of Family Code
308.5 that the court struck down. 86 The California Supreme
Court heard oral arguments for the cases challenging Proposition
8 on March 5, 2009.87

IV. Cases Decided Between Goodridge and In re
Marriage Cases
In many ways, the California case can be viewed as one that
re-shifted the momentum behind the issue of marriage equality,
coming as it did after five high courts departed from the Massa
chusetts outcome.
Between the time Goodridgewas decided and when the Cal
ifornia court considered the same issue, five other state supreme
courts heard challenges to and sustained exclusionary state mar
riage laws.88 In one of them, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
unconstitutional the statutory framework but declined to remedy
it by requiring that same-sex couples be allowed to marry. 89 In
the other four states, Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Wash
ington, the high courts fully sustained the exclusionary laws. In
Maryland, Oregon, and Washington, the legislature passed do
mestic partnership laws subsequent to the courts' decisions that
provided same-sex couples with limited rights and benefits. 90
See id. at 89-90.
See id. at 90.
87 Press Release, Lynn Holton, Public Information Officer, Administra
tive Office of the Courts, Judicial Council of California (Feb. 3, 2009), available
at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR08-09.PDF.
88 See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 908
A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006);
Li. & Kennedy v. Oregon,, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005); Andersen v. King County,
138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2005).
89 Lewis, 908 A.2d 196.
90 Oregon Family Fairness Act, ch. 99, 2007 Or. Laws (became effective
July 22, 2007); 2008 Md. Laws 590 (passed May 22, 2008 and became effective
July 1, 2008); Act of April 21, 2007, ch. 156, 2007 Wash. Sess. Laws (passed Apr.
21, 2007, and became effective July 22, 2007).
85

86
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As in California and Massachusetts, plaintiffs in the other
states challenged state marriage laws focusing principally on
equality and due process protections under state constitutions.
However, none of the plaintiffs in those cases could convince
their state courts that classifications based on sexual orientation

required a heightened level of scrutiny. Applying rational basis
review, those courts had little problem accepting some state justi
fication for the differential treatment of same and different-sex
couples. In both New York and Washington, the courts con
cluded that the state anti-marriage laws9 ' were constitutional be
cause they served the legitimate purpose of encouraging
procreation and the well-being of children. The New York law
was challenged under equal protection and due process. 92 The
Washington law was challenged under privileges and immunities
and due process. 93 The courts spent very little time discussing
equal protection, due process, or privileges and immunities after
rationalizing the prohibitions on same-sex marriage, simply reit
erating procreation and child welfare as legitimate purposes for
the state exclusionary laws. Because marriage for same-sex

couples could not, according to the courts, encourage procreation
or child welfare, the state bans on same-sex marriage did not
deny plaintiff couples their constitutional rights. 94 The Her
nandez court went even further in rejecting the scientific legiti
macy of the studies that suggest that children raised by same-sex
children are no worse off than those raised by different-sex
95
parents.

91

N.Y.

DOM. REL. LAW

§ 12 (1999) (marriage-how solemnized), N.Y.

DOM.

REL. LAW § 15 (1999) (marriage- duty
REL. LAW § 5 (2008) (incestuous and void

of town and city clerk), N.Y. DOM.
marriages), N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 50 (2008) (property of married woman); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010
(1998) (marriage as a civil contract that is valid only if "between a male and a

female"); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(1)(c) (1998) (marriage contract is pro
hibited for couples "other than a male and a female."); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.04.020(3) (1998) ("[a] marriage between two persons that is recognized as
valid in another jurisdiction is valid in this state only if the marriage is not pro
hibited or made unlawful under subsection ... (1)(c) ... of this section.").
92 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1.
93 Andersen, 138 P.3d 963.
94 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d 1; Andersen, 138 P.3d 963.
95 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 8.
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In Oregon and New Jersey, deference to the state legislature
largely resolved the cases. In Oregon, plaintiffs brought a lawsuit
against the state after the State Registrar refused to file marriage
licenses that were issued by their county of residence, Multno
mah County. The plaintiffs argued the refusal violated Oregon's
privileges and immunities clause. However, before the Oregon
Supreme Court could resolve that issue, the voters of Oregon
passed a law defining marriage as being exclusively between a
man and a woman. The Oregon Supreme Court ultimately said
that its role was to enforce the voters' intent, and because the
voters defined marriage heterosexually, the Oregon Supreme
Court upheld that definition. 96 In New Jersey, plaintiffs filed a
lawsuit against the state because of its refusal to grant licenses to
same-sex couples. They argued this violated their privacy, equal
protection and due process rights. 97 The New Jersey Supreme
Court agreed that same-sex couples are entitled to equality, but
disagreed that there was a fundamental right at stake in the case
for the plaintiffs. 98 Ultimately, the court determined that the is
sue raised a legislative question. In response to the decision, the
New Jersey legislature passed a civil union law. 99

V. Viability of Marriages of Out-of-State Couples
Married in Massachusetts
Notwithstanding the setbacks in some states where same-sex
couples sought marriage equality and the slow progress to equal
ity across the country, the fact of Massachusetts allowing samesex couples to marry impacted marriage equality nationwide.
While there remain some questions about the validity of certain
marriages enterered into in Massachusetts by non-resident
couples, there is also certainty about the validity of others.
The Massachusetts marriage case was significant for setting a
precedent, allowing same-sex couples, for the first time in this
96
97
98

Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005).
Lewis, 908 A.2d 196.

Id. at 205.

99 A recent study commissioned by the legislature concluded that civil
unions are inadequate to protect same-sex couples. What steps the legislature
will take in response to this study is unclear. The first interim report of the New
Jersey Civil Union Review Commission, Feb. 19, 2008, is available at: http://
www.state.nj.us/lps/dcr/downloads/lst-InterimReport-CURC.pdf.
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country, to marry. In seeming acknowledgement of the weight of
this fact, the Supreme Judicial Court did not issue an immediate
remedy to the plaintiffs. Rather, it concluded that, "[e]ntry of
judgment shall be stayed for 180 days to permit the Legislature to
take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of this opin
ion."' 0 0 While there was some initial question whether this
meant that the court would allow the legislature to create a mar
riage equivalent, the likes of which had been created by Ver
mont's adoption of a civil union law, 101 any confusion about the
matter was cleared up in response to a question put to the Su
preme Judicial Court by the Massachusetts Senate President. In
Opinion of the Justices, the high court put to rest any suggestion
that the court had left open such a possibility. As the court made
clear, "[the bill] would deny to same-sex 'spouses' only a status
that is specially recognized in society and has significant social
and other advantages. The Massachusetts Constitution, as the
invidious dis
Goodridgeopinion explained, does not permit such
10 2
intentioned."'
well
how
crimination, no matter
Nevertheless, because of the time permitted for enforcement
of the Goodridge decision to allow the legislature to take some
action-the substance of which was never clear and which was
never taken-same-sex couples were not permitted to marry in
Massachusetts until May 17, 2004. On that day, however, hun
dreds of couples flocked to local city and town halls to marry,
many seeking and securing court orders allowing bypass of the
usual waiting period between the filing of paperwork to marry
and the issuance of the licenses themselves.'0 3 Among those who
married included individuals from throughout the country who
came to Massachusetts to marry their loved ones despite not be
ing residents of the Commonwealth.
For a short period of time, many town clerks issued licenses
freely to out-of-state couples. Former Massachusetts Governor
Mitt Romney stopped that practice shortly after it began through
a directive issued by then-Attorney General Tom Reilly. The di
rective called to the towns' attention the criminal enforcement
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 970.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (1999).
102 Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004).
103 Thomas Caywood, Same-Sex Marriage"Mass. Gay Couples Wedded to
History, BOSTON HERALD, May 18, 2004, at 6.
100
101
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statute for issuing licenses to non-residents in violation of the
Massachusetts reverse evasion law. 1°4 The Governor instructed
the Attorney General to take this action after an investigation
that involved a review of the records from several towns that the
news media had reported were marrying out-of-state same-sex
couples.
The Governor's view of the enforceability of the law was not
immediately obvious given that the statute had been a dead letter
for many years. In addition, similar reverse evasion laws had
only ever been adopted in five other jurisdictions and it is some
what unclear the extent to which they had ever been enforced
either. 10 5 However, in at least one of those jurisdictions, Ver
mont, the reverse evasion law had not been enforced 0 6 to ex
clude out-of-state same-sex couples from traveling to Vermont
and entering into civil unions notwithstanding the legal chal
lenges that has created for some couples.' 07 Nonetheless, the
borders to Massachusetts were effectively shut down to out-of
state same-sex couples wishing to marry for nearly four years af
ter the Goodridge case was decided. It was not until July, 2008,
that the Massachusetts legislature repealed the reverse evasion
law, finally fully opening the Massachusetts borders to same-sex
couples from throughout the country to enjoy Massachusetts'
non-discriminatory laws.' 0 8
Six couples hailing from Rhode Island, Vermont, New York,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine brought a constitu
tional challenge to the Massachusetts reverse evasion law arguing
that the law violated the basic guarantees the Massachusetts high
court had just found protected Massachusetts couples as well as
guarantees of equality for out-of-state couples otherwise pro
104

105
STAT.
STAT.

(1912).

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 10.
Illinois, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27 (1915);

New Hampshire, N.H. REv.

§457:44 (1979); Vermont, 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 6 (1912); Wisconsin, Wis.
ANN. § 765.04 (1915); Wyoming, Wyo, STAT. ANN. 1977 § 20-1-103

106 Indeed, the Vermont Supreme Court has since said that the reverse
evasion law may not be enforced to either deny or invalidate civil unions en
tered into by out-of-state couples. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d
951, I 37-40(Vt. 2006)
107 See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951(Vt. 2006);
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008).
108 MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 216 of the Acts of 2008.
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tected under the privileges and immunities clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 10 9 The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with the
Massachusetts governor's restrictive interpretation of the reverse
evasion law although the challenge was only partially
successful. 110
In March of 2006, the high court remanded the case and is
sued guidance regarding both which out-of-state couples could
marry and what the marital status was of those non-residents
who had come to Massachusetts to marry in the intervening pe
riod."' Following that guidance, the trial court on remand deter
mined that in the absence of any express prohibition against
same-sex couples marrying in Rhode Island, the Rhode Island
couple plaintiffs (and other Rhode Island residents) could marry
in Massachusetts. To the contrary, in light of the intervening
New York high court decision prohibiting same-sex couples from
marrying in that state," 2 the New Yorkers could not. However,
the same judge held New York residents who had married be
tween May 17, 2004 and July 6, 2006-the date of the New York
high court decision sustaining the New York exclusionary mar
3
riage laws-had done so lawfully."
As a result of the Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public
Health case, the law was clear on the point that some out-of-state
couples could lawfully marry and others could not. Of course, as
a factual matter, many out-of-state couples had come to Massa
chusetts and married despite the later issued opinion suggesting
that at least some of those licenses had not issued lawfully. The
question for those couples is what the issuance of that license
legally means to them. The question has greater significance
than its personal import to the individuals and couples today be
cause of what it may mean about the political efforts to reverse
the road to equality paved by the issuance of the Goodridge
opinion (and its implementation) and furthered by the In re Mar
riage Cases decided by the California Supreme Court. The legal
109 Cote-Whitacre v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2006).
110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Hernandez, 7 N.Y.3d 338.
Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 2006 WL 3208758, Memoran

113

dum of Decision on Whether Same-Sex Marriage Is Prohibited in N.Y. and
R.I. (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2006).
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analysis of the meaning of those Massachusetts marriage licenses
issued when Massachusetts still had a reverse evasion law bears
greatly on the political efforts to stop the evolution from nation
wide marriage exclusion for same-sex couples to full nationwide
11 4
equality.
As a result of the combined legal landscape created by the
Romney border closing to out-of-state same-sex couples, the
challenge to his broad interpretation of the reverse evasion law,

and its ultimate repeal, significant questions exist for out-of-state
couples about the validity of their marriages. In sorting through
the validity of those marriages entered into by non-resident
couples before the repeal of Massachusetts' reverse evasion law,

there are two key questions to ask. First, in what state did the
couple reside when they married? Second, did the couple hon
estly represent their intention to either reside or not reside in

115
Massachusetts in filling out their marriage license application?

For out-of-state couples who neither resided in nor intended
to reside in Massachusetts, the validity of their relationship turns
on what their home state said (or did not say) about the permissi
bility of marriage between same sex-couples. According to the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, home states can fall into
one of three categories with regard to the permissibility of a
same-sex couple entering into a marriage. It can either be a
"void home state,"1 16 a prohibited home state,"" 7 or a "silent or
114

In July of 2008, the Massachusetts legislature repealed the reverse eva

sion law and the new gubernatorial administration lead by Deval Patrick has
since directed the local city and town clerks to issue marriage license to couples
regardless of residency. See Katie Zezima, Massachusetts: Same-Sex Couples
from Other States May Now Marry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at A13.
115 The Massachusetts marriage application asks out-of-state couples
whether they reside or intend to reside in Massachusetts. It is this residency or
intended residency qualification that satisfies the residency requirement created
by the now-repealed reverse evasion law.
116 A void home state is one whose marriage licensing laws explicitly state
that a marriage entered into by a same-sex couple is "void." The Cote-Whitacre
court offered Maine as an example of such a state, but many others exist as
well.
117 A prohibited home state is one whose laws prohibit same-sex couples
from marrying but which don't explicitly designate such relationships as "void."
See Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d at 636-637 n.9. The Cote-Whitacre court identi
fied Connecticut, Vermont and New Hampshire as examples. Id. at 637 n.9.
Each state has incorporated a statement of the prohibition of marriages for
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ambiguous home state."1 18 Marriage licenses issued to persons
residing in a void home state with no intention to reside in Mas
sachusetts are not valid. That is to say, the marriage licenses
were unauthorized from their issuance and the resulting marriage
is therefore void from the date of its inception. At least accord
ing to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, such marriages
are "an absolute nullity and [are] not entitled to any recognition
or legal status" in Massachusetts.1 19 The good news is that there
is absolute clarity; the bad news is that such marriages have no
legal significance.
For couples who came to Massachusetts from home states
that prohibited same-sex marriage and stated that they have no
intention to reside in Massachusetts, there is somewhat less clar
ity about the legal validity of their relationships. Although the
Supreme Judicial Court made clear that before the repeal of the
reverse evasion law, couples from prohibited home states could
not come to Massachusetts and marry, it did not state that such
licenses are void but rather that they are voidable.' 20 As a result,
the marriage is a valid marriage until declared void by a court.
More specifically, the marriage is "presumptively valid" and
"should for all legal purposes be treated as a valid marriage" un
less and until a court says otherwise. 2 1 At least in Massachu
setts, only a party to the marriage itself can seek dissolution or
annulment of a voidable marriage. Typically death of one of the
parties to the marriage would terminate the opportunity of either
of the parties to seek dissolution or annulment and, again typi
cally, third parties could not challenge the status of the relation
ship. 12 2 Of course, this analysis only reveals what Massachusetts'
view of the validity of the marriage is and does not answer how
same-sex couples as part of their adoption of a comprehensive non-marriage
alternative, civil union.
118 Silent or ambiguous home states are one whose laws do not include a
positive prohibition or a positive permission for same-sex couples to marry.
Rhode Island and New Mexico are examples of silent or ambiguous home
states. New York was a silent or ambiguous home state until the status of ac
cess to marriage was clarified by the state high court in the case of Hernandez,7
N.Y.3d 338.
119 Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d at 636 n.8 (citations omitted).
120 Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d 623.
121 Id. at 637 n.10, 638 n.il.
122

Id. at 636-37.
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the couples' home state, or any other state for that matter, will
regard the permissibility of the marriage. Unlike the out-of-state
residents who married from void home states, couples who mar
ried from prohibited home states will need to individually assess
the likely recognition of that marriage in other jurisdictions when
considering questions such as (1) what legal steps should I take
to care for my family; (2) must I get divorced to marry again; (3)
how can I (and do I need to) lift the cloud over the validity of my
marital status?
As for out-of-state couples who married from silent or am
biguous home states, those marriage licenses properly issued are,
at least from the Massachusetts perspective, perfectly valid. Mas
sachusetts courts and state agencies have clarified that with re
spect to couples who came to Massachusetts to marry from
Rhode Island and New Mexico, those marriage licenses were val
idly issued.1 2 3 As to couples who came from New York, marriage
licenses issued prior to July 6, 2006, the date of the Hernandez
124
decision, were valid.
All in all, what this analysis suggests is that there are many
couples from around the country who traveled to Massachusetts
during the four years when it was the only state to allow mar
riages for same-sex couples whose marriages were validly issued.
Moreover, until and unless some future political events transpire,
Massachusetts borders are open, just as they are for different-sex
couples, for non-resident same-sex couples to come to the Com
monwealth and marry. While questions remain about the extent
to which other states will recognize those marriages, 125 there are
Cote-Whitacre, 844 N.E.2d 623.
There isanother category of people who may have lied on their license
applications about their intent to reside in Massachusetts. Although Massachu
setts has typically allowed non-residents to marry regardless of where they re
sided as long as they intended to relocate to Massachusetts, this loophole will
likely not ensure the validity of an otherwise issued license if the couple filling
out the application cannot prove the truth of the assertion. There are no re
ported decisions in this area of the law but the Cote-Whitacre court reminded
the plaintiffs that "fraud that goes to the essence of a marriage contract renders
a marriage 'voidable."' Id. at 637 n.10. In assessing the validity of these mar
riages, a court may consider both the nature of the misrepresentation and,
again, who it is that is challenging the validity of the marriage.
125 Although much predictive scholarship exists about the extent to which
marriages will be recognized by other states when (at a time when the question
123

124

Vol. 22, 2009

MarriageEquality for Same-Sex Couples

no remaining questions about the validity of the licenses that
issue.

VI. Iowa on the Horizon
A challenge to Iowa's exclusionary marriage laws was re
solved on summary judgment by the District Court for Polk
County in August, 2007, and then appealed and argued to the
Iowa Supreme Court on December 9, 2008. A decision by the
state high court is currently pending. 126 The outcome of this case
may affect the trajectory of marriage equality in this country de
pending particularly on what happens in California.
Six same-sex couples with established relationships that
ranged between 5 and 16 years (at the time the case was brought)
challenged Iowa's exclusionary marriage laws in a case pursued
in the District Court for Polk County that was heard on crossmotions for summary judgment in May, 2007. In a slightly differ
ent procedural maneuver than that used in any of the other re
cent marriage cases, the parties filed extensive supporting
submissions that detailed the facts that would be demonstrated
upon a trial should the court reject both of the motions for sum
mary judgment. The Iowa court looked closely at the proposed
experts and topics and statements that the parties expected to
establish at trial, rejecting many of those proposed by the de
fendants as inadmissible. Moreover, the court accepted as mate
rial facts as to which there is no genuine dispute "all those facts"
contained in the statement of materials facts submitted in sup
port of the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion which were de
nied in the defendant's response. These facts include those that
was more hypothetical) a state allows same-sex couples to marry, very little has
been written since Massachusetts and now California began issuing valid li
censes. Barbara Cox, Interstate Validation of Marriages and Civil Unions, 30
HUM. RTS. Q. 5 (Summer 2003); Barbara Cox, Same-Sex Marriageand Choice
of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Get Home?,
1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033-1118; Barbara Cox, Using an 'Incidents of Marriage'
Analysis When ConsideringInterstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Mar
riages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships,13 WIDENER L.J. 699 (2004);
Joseph William Singer, Same-Sex Marriage,Full Faith and Credit, and the Eva
sion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & Civ. LIBERTIES 1 (Apr. 2005).
126 Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Polk County, 2007).
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turned out to be central to the district court's evaluation of the
application of the standard of review to the challenge.
In particular, for example, the court found as a material fact
that "[t]here is consensus within the mainstream scientific com
munity that parental sexual orientation has no effect on chil
dren's adjustment. ' 127 The court also determined that "[n]othing
about a parent's sex or sexual orientation affects either that par
ent's capacity to be a good parent or a child's health develop
ment. . . Lesbian and gay persons have the capacity to raise
healthy and well-adjusted children."'1 28 In no small part based on
the court's evaluation of the factual issues before it, the district
court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and against the
defendant deciding the case on fundamental rights and equal
protection. The court rejected all of the justifications offered by
the defendant including all those resting on child-related grounds
as well as that of conserving state and private resources and pro
moting traditional marriage.
As of the date of publication of this Article, the Iowa Su
preme Court had heard oral arguments and a decision was
pending.

VII. Conclusion
The last five years have seen both successes and defeats in
the struggle for marriage equality for same sex couples. No
doubt, the landmark decision of Goodridge v. Dep't of Public
Health, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that same-sex couples could not constitutionally be excluded
from marriage equality, irreversibly changed the legal landscape
for committed, loving same-sex couples. What could not have
been predicted at that time and what cannot be predicted still is
what the course of progress toward full marriage equality nation
wide (indeed, internationally)1 29 will ultimately look like.
However, what is known at this time clearly is that
thousands of couples across this country are legally and validly
married. This includes couples who have lawfully married in
127
128

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.

129 The international dimensions of this issue are well beyond the scope of
this article.
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Massachusetts, California, and most recently in Connecticut.
While the future ability to marry in California remains an un
known, despite legal efforts there and in other parts of the coun
try to reverse the course of history and shut down the possibility
of same-sex couples being able to marry, there is no turning
back. Progress toward full marriage equality has begun in ear
nest. The next several years may determine the pace at which
full equality is achieved but there can be no real doubt of its
attainment.

